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Current Regulatory Challenges in
Consumer Credit Scoring Using
Alternative Data-Driven
Methodologies
ABSTRACT
Credit is a crucial determinant of financial success for most US
consumers, but not all consumers can access it. This financial exclusion
is partially due to traditional credit-risk scoring and approval processes
that cannot assess the creditworthiness of “credit invisible” or “thin file”
consumers––that is, consumers who do not have enough traditional
data depicting their financial payment history. Consequently, some
consumer-reporting agencies and lenders turn to alternative data
credit-scoring systems as a way to increase financial inclusion. The
enormous complexity of these alternative consumer credit-scoring
systems, however, raises significant accuracy and transparency
issues—most of which stem from their secret, legally protected
status—as well as heightened concerns over the use of discriminatory
and biased scoring practices using nontraditional behavioral data. If
these issues are not addressed, alternative data-driven credit-scoring
systems can potentially amplify transparency and discrimination issues,
preventing consumers from understanding the factors that impact their
credit scores. At the same time, they can position underprivileged groups
to face increased discrimination in terms of both accessing credit and
receiving favorable interest rates.
This Note proposes four regulatory solutions and suggests
enhancements to the Model Fairness and Transparency in Credit
Scoring Act developed by legal and technology scholars Hurley and
Adebayo. The current regulatory framework can better address
discrimination by requiring lenders to disclose how they define
“creditworthiness” so that consumers can gain a better understanding of
the standards to which they are being held. It can also push lenders to
foster more appropriate credit standards. Moreover, federal legislation
is needed to curtail or prohibit the use of nontraditional behavioral data,
especially data derived from a consumer’s social networks, which can
unfairly penalize consumers for their social or cultural associations. If
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this type of legislation is not likely to pass at a federal level, then
regulatory agencies should regulate these firms under the presumption
that behavioral data is inherently discriminatory until proven
otherwise. Finally, regulators should seek to incentivize firms using
alternative credit scoring methodologies to seek no-action letters.
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Imagine you are eighteen, on the cusp of many exciting life
changes—going off to college, buying your first car so you can actually
get there, applying for a summer job to pay for gas, and maybe even
putting in an application for a nice first apartment. Now imagine
another scenario—you are brand new to this country, eager to start
chasing your version of the American dream. You have never held a job
or owned anything in this country, nor have you paid any bills or opened
any bank accounts. In both of these scenarios, you have big dreams that
are nearly impossible to achieve unless you can access credit.
Access to credit can be a key determinant of financial success
for a majority of Americans and is typically determined by an
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individual’s consumer credit rating.1 A consumer’s credit rating
can impact her in many important ways, such as gaining access
to employment opportunities, obtaining higher education, and
purchasing assets, such as a home and a car—assets that are
traditionally considered crucial to building individual financial
wealth.2 In some instances, such as when families struggle
financially, credit is necessary for survival and is used to pay for
nondiscretionary, essential goods, such as food and housing.3
Unfortunately, there are approximately forty-five million people,
primarily from Black and Hispanic backgrounds, who are considered
“unscorable” because credit-scoring firms are unable to provide an
assessment of their credit risk using traditional scoring tools.4
Credit risk, which is summarized in a credit score, is simply
defined as the “potential that a borrower or counterparty will fail to
perform on an obligation.”5 However, with recent advances in
machine learning and the proliferation of credit firms that utilize new
types of data (“alternative data”) and methodologies, the way credit
risk, particularly consumer credit risk, is assessed will continue to
change significantly.6
This Note examines how consumer credit risk scoring works,
how it is changing, and potential solutions to fill the gaps in the
existing regulatory framework. Part I discusses the differences
between using traditional and alternative data in credit risk scoring.
Next, Part II introduces the existing regulatory scheme for credit
reporting and identifies areas where it falls short in protecting
consumers. Part III proposes potential solutions to improve the
consumer credit scoring process to address the risk of discrimination
posed by using alternative data and concludes that lenders using
1.
See Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 148, 153–54 (2016).
2.
See id. at 202.
3.
Examining the Use of Alternative Data in Underwriting and Credit Scoring to Expand
Access to Credit: Hearing Before the Task Force on Fin. Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
116th Cong. 7–8 (2019) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kristin N. Johnson, McGlinchey
Stafford Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Faculty Research, Tulane University
Law School), https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109867/witnesses/HHRG-116-BA00Wstate-JohnsonK-20190725.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7FY-S8YP].
4.
See Request for Information Regarding Use of Alternative Data and Modeling
Techniques in the Credit Process, 82 Fed. Reg. 11183, 11184 (2017) [hereinafter Request for
Information]; BD . OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, at 26 (2019).
5.
Supervisory Policy and Guidance Topics, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV.
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/credit_risk.htm [https://perma.cc/
2LVY-Z5VE] (Dec. 22, 2020).
6.
See generally Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1.
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alternative credit scoring methodologies should be held to more
stringent regulatory standards. Finally, Part IV provides a brief
future outlook on the use of alternative data in consumer credit
scoring.
I. TRADITIONAL VERSUS ALTERNATIVE DATA IN CREDIT RISK SCORING
Access to household debt is typically determined by the
automated scoring criteria adopted by a specific lender.7 Lenders can
evaluate the creditworthiness of a consumer based on scores derived
from “traditional data,” “alternative data,” or a combination of both.8
Traditional data, according to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), includes information relating to loans or credit
limits, repayment of debt, inquiries into credit history, and other
relevant information from publicly available records.9
In contrast, alternative data consists of all data that falls
outside of the scope of traditional data, though there is no bright-line
rule to differentiate the two.10 The CFPB mentioned several forms of
alternative data in its 2017 request for information, including
periodic payments data for non-loan products such as phone
payments; rent, insurance, and utility bill payments; checking
account transaction-level data; data related to a consumer’s
educational and occupational history; consumer behavioral data; and
data derived from a consumer’s social media network.11 Alternative
data can also capture the consumer’s history of using alternative
credit products, such as “payday loans, cash advances, short-term

7.
See Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem, Glenn B. Canner & Raphael W. Bostic, An
Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89 FED. RSRV. BULL. 47, 48 (2003); Request for
Information, supra note 4; FED. RSRV. BANK OF N.Y., QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT
AND CREDIT 2019: Q3, at 3 (2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/interactives/householdcredit/data/pdf/hhdc_2019q3.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2yyO5tgmW-5ZawcKGLKNpemcBrgxOZ7SQC
wIy-l3pr5Na_MLEDLVBMdmc [https://perma.cc/H5TU-XP5B] (reporting that aggregate
household debt totaled $13.95 trillion in the third quarter of 2019).
8.
Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184.
9.
Id. (“[D]ata assembled and managed in the core credit files of the nationwide consumer
reporting agencies, which includes tradeline information (including certain loan or credit limit
information, debt repayment history, and account status), and credit inquiries, as well as
information from public records relating to civil judgments, tax liens, and bankruptcies. It also
refers to data customarily provided by consumers as part of applications for credit, such as income
or length of time in residence.”).
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 11185.
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installment loans, rent-to-own and title loans.”12 Many forms of
alternative data are also considered “Big Data,” which is a distinct
concept.13 Big Data is defined as “high-volume, high velocity, and
high-variety” information and extends all the way from data related
to consumer payment history to digital footprint data from users of
smartphones.14
A. How Consumer Credit Scores Are Used
In evaluating the creditworthiness of a consumer, lenders can
use their own proprietary scoring models, refer to well-known
third-party models such as FICO or VantageScore, or utilize some
combination of both.15 The creditworthiness of a consumer is
summarized in the credit score assigned to her, and it is used by
lenders to evaluate the consumer’s likelihood of defaulting, making
significantly delinquent payments, or triggering other negative
financial shock.16 For over thirty years, the third-party models
developed by FICO and VantageScore have been the primary ways of
scoring consumers seeking credit.17 In addition to lenders, potential
employers and landlords also frequently use credit scores as a way to
evaluate potential employees or tenants.18
Credit scores and the underlying data are compiled into credit
reports (also referred to as “consumer reports”) by consumer reporting
agencies (CRAs), such as TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax.19 The
data in the credit reports created by CRAs informs the traditional
consumer credit score (e.g., FICO or VantageScore) that is reported,
and, if lenders choose to use their own proprietary models, they can
evaluate consumers using the data captured in the report.20 For
the purposes of reporting traditional consumer credit scores, the

12.
The State of Alternative Credit Data, EXPERIAN 18 (2018), https://www.experian.com/
assets/consumer-information/white-papers/alternative-credit-data-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6EGA-MGHR].
13.
Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184 n.4.
14.
Ceylan Onay & Elif Öztürk, A Review of Credit Scoring Research in the Age of Big
Data, 26 J. FIN. REGUL. & COMPLIANCE 382, 382–83 (2018).
15.
Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184.
16.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 153–54; Request for Information, supra note 4, at
11184.
17.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 154; Latoya Irby, VantageScore Credit Score
Overview, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/vantagescore-credit-score-overview-961140
[https://perma.cc/5DL6-7HG9] (May 1, 2020).
18.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 154.
19.
Id.
20.
Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184.
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CRAs maintain and utilize traditional data that falls into four
categories: header data (data that helps identify the consumer),
public record data, tradeline data on each loan or line of credit the
consumer has obtained, and inquiry data that depicts the number of
inquiries made into the consumer’s credit files.21
The credit score reported in a consumer’s credit report is not
entirely a reflection of the individual consumer’s likelihood of default;
rather, it reflects the historical rates of default within a group of
borrowers who share the same credit score.22 In other words,
borrowers are segmented into various score bands, and each score
band has a corresponding predicted rate of default, where consumers
in the higher score bands have lower historical rates of default and
consumers in the lower score bands are viewed as high-risk borrowers
due to higher historical rates of default.23 Lenders use these scores to
determine which consumers they view as creditworthy; to this end,
lenders establish a cutoff score below which they will not extend
credit.24
B. The Purpose of Using Alternative Data for Consumer Credit Scoring
Given how important a credit report with a reportable score is
to accessing consumer credit, consumers who either do not have any
credit history on file with a CRA or have not yet generated a sufficient
credit history for a traditional credit score have a very difficult
time accessing consumer credit, and they may need to resort to
high-interest substitutes that can further disadvantage them
financially.25 As of 2015, the Bureau has estimated that twenty-six
million Americans are “credit invisible” and have no file at the three
major CRAs, while another nineteen million do not have sufficient
data on file to develop a traditional credit score.26 This population of
forty-five million unscorable consumers is primarily comprised of
individuals from historically underprivileged communities, including
consumers from Black, Hispanic, and low-income backgrounds.27 Of
the adults who applied for credit in 2018, nearly one-third were
21.
Peter Carroll & Saba Rehmani, Alternative Data and the Unbanked, OLIVER WYMAN
14 (2017), https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/v2/publications/2017/may/Alternative_Data_And_The_%20Unbanked.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH5K-HYZ8].
22.
Id. at 4.
23.
Id. at 5.
24.
Id. at 4.
25.
Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11184.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
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denied credit or offered less than what they applied for.28 Of that
sample, 76 percent of those denied credit were Black and Hispanic.29
Alternative data and its corresponding algorithms have been
recognized by both lenders and regulators alike as potential tools
to increase inclusion of consumers from historically disadvantaged
communities into the financial system.30 Additionally, the use of
alternative data may allow lenders to identify creditworthy
consumers who would otherwise fall into score bands below the cutoff
in traditional credit scoring systems; in other words, alternative data
may be able to improve the granularity of the score bands used to
compute credit scores.31 This added granularity could help borrowers
in lower score bands access credit at lower interest rates, as there
would be a way to differentiate between borrowers who are near the
cutoff but still creditworthy.32 Finally, in addition to increasing
financial inclusion and enhancing estimates of creditworthiness,
alternative data also has the potential to improve the timeliness, or
temporal relevance, of assessments and decrease transaction costs for
lenders by improving the accuracy of decision-making.33
The characteristics of good alternative data include timeliness
and accuracy, relevance to the intended behavioral prediction,
regulatory compliance, “broad and consistent coverage” across
consumers, “consumer-specific” elements (rather than elements
based on consumer segments), and “orthogonality”––the notion that
the alternative data can work in conjunction with traditional data to
improve the “predictive accuracy” of the credit score.34 Logically,
these characteristics are relevant to any data used in predictive
modeling: the data should be related to the purpose of the model,
comply with existing regulations, and be as individualized as
possible, given that the model’s ultimate prediction will be
individualized. Moreover, alternative data should be thought of as a
way to enhance or improve existing data.35

28.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., supra note 4, at 26.
29.
Id.
30.
See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. & Off. of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Interagency Statement on the Use of Alternative Data in Credit Underwriting (Dec.
3, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20191203b1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46NW-KSNB].
31.
Carroll & Rehmani, supra note 21, at 2.
32.
Id. at 10.
33.
Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11186.
34.
Carroll & Rehmani, supra note 21, at 9.
35.
See id. at 8–9.
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January 2019 research from the Federal Reserve Bank showed
optimistic results for using alternative data in consumer lending
scoring models.36 Specifically, LendingClub consumer ratings were
more strongly correlated with loan performance and interest
rates than ratings created by traditional lenders (i.e., banks).37
Additionally, financial inclusion was increased, and borrowers who
would have otherwise been in a subprime score band were able to gain
access to credit.38 While this may be very promising news, there are
several regulatory issues that must be addressed before similar
results can be seen across the credit-scoring industry.
C. Current Issues with Using Alternative Data in Consumer Credit
Risk Scoring
One of the primary issues stemming from the use of alternative
data is the ability to use nontraditional data—especially behavioral
data unrelated to a consumer’s financial status or history.39 Internet
browsing-related data (e.g., search history) and social network
data—including an analysis of where the consumer is perceived to
fall within the hierarchy of her social network—fall within this
category of alternative data.40 One fintech firm, ZestFinance, collects
behavioral data from its own website, including how quickly a
consumer scrolls through the firm’s consumer disclosures to represent
how carefully the consumer arrives at a decision.41 Other examples
include club memberships, online shopping behavior, and online
profile data.42 In addition to the potential regulatory violations
(discussed in Part II), this type of data, on its face, is not intuitively
relevant to the intended behavioral prediction: the consumer’s
propensity to default or make delinquent payments.43 Indeed, experts

36.
See Julapa Jagtiani & Catharine Lemieux, The Roles of Alternative Data and Machine
Learning in Fintech Lending: Evidence from the LendingClub Consumer Platform 18 (Fed. Rsrv.
Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 18-15, 2019), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/assets/working-papers/2018/wp18-15r.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/FR8U-3PQC].
37.
See id.
38.
See id.
39.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 164–68.
40.
See Hearing, supra note 3, at 5.
41.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 164–65 (describing the scoring model used by
ZestFinance, “one of the most prominent players in the alternative credit-scoring and underwriting
industry”).
42.
Id. at 165 (providing examples of other alternative data inputs used by firms in
consumer credit scoring).
43.
Id. at 164–65.
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criticize the use of data elements that are not inherently tied to
creditworthiness in the “all data is credit data” approach.44
1. Data Quality and Accuracy Issues with Alternative Data
The use of alternative data raises additional challenges—data
quality and accuracy issues.45 CRAs run into accuracy issues even
with traditional data, which uses a smaller set of data relative to most
forms of alternative data.46 It makes sense that with alternative
data—where there is a much higher volume of data generated—size
itself becomes an issue when it comes to ensuring that the collected
data is accurate.47
In 2013, fifteen National Consumer Law Center employees
conducted a survey to view the consumer data collected on each of
them by four Big Data brokers: eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, and
Spokeo.48 Errors were found in nearly two-thirds of the sixty reports
generated.49 The survey participants had to take several steps to
request the reports, verify their identifies, and sometimes pay to
receive the individual consumer reports.50 There was a broad range of
types of information errors; most errors were observed in data related
to address and residence information, education, family members,
social profiles, and income.51
Even more recently, research has shown that some of the Big
Data “continuously mined” from consumer activities “may incorporate
a high degree of inaccurate information.”52 The CFPB, in its 2017
request for information, indicated that the data accuracy issues in
alternative data are greater than those observed in traditional data.
This inaccuracy is attributable to either the nature of the data itself
or lower standards for data quality and accuracy in uses of the
alternative data outside of credit scoring.53

44.
Id. at 158, 164.
45.
Id. at 152.
46.
Id. at 152–53.
47.
Id. at 153.
48.
Persis Yu, Jillian McLaughlin & Marina Levy, Big Data: A Big Disappointment
for Scoring Consumer Creditworthiness, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 15 (Mar. 3, 2014),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-big-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/VN4Q-TSF6].
49.
Id. at 18.
50.
Id. at 16–17.
51.
Id. at 18.
52.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 153.
53.
Request for Information, supra note 4, at 11187.
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2. The Role of Algorithms in Consumer Credit Scoring
Before addressing the issues stemming from the algorithms
and tools used in conjunction with alternative data, it is important to
understand the relationship between these algorithms and Big Data
used to analyze or identify alternative data for credit scoring. An
algorithm is a model that uses a computational process to analyze
input data and generate output data.54 Firms can develop algorithms
to identify relationships between various types of input data. These
firms can identify relationships either through supervised machine
learning, where a researcher assesses how different data elements
impact the desired output (e.g., predicted default rate), or through
unsupervised learning, where the algorithm identifies relationships
between data inputs and identifies patterns in data regardless of how
they relate to the specific desired output variable, if there is one.55
The extremely complex credit-scoring algorithms are designed
to analyze and identify relationships within a high volume and
broad variety of Big Data, especially nontraditional data (e.g.,
behavioral data) generated from consumer social media and spending
records.56 At times—and especially in the context of supervised
algorithms—raw data must be transformed into data sets.57 Data
transformation can involve complex steps that incorporate multiple
layers of information, sometimes generating “metavariables” that
summarize relationships between multiple data points.58 Data
transformation is just one component that complicates the use of
alternative credit scoring systems. Once the data is actually
translated, it is analyzed through the many complex models that
comprise the algorithm.59 The complexity of this process makes it
highly unlikely that consumers could identify data quality issues in
the input data feeding the models.60 This complexity demands
investigation of the gaps and recent developments in the existing
regulatory scheme, which must adapt in a timely manner to address
the risks stemming from such a complex process.

54.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 159 (defining algorithms as “any well-defined
computational procedure that takes some value, or set of values, as input and produces some value,
or set of values, as an output.”) (citation omitted).
55.
Id. at 161–62.
56.
Id. at 152, 163.
57.
See id. at 174, 176.
58.
Id. at 176.
59.
Id. at 181.
60.
Id. at 182.
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II. THE EXISTING REGULATORY SCHEME AND ITS CURRENT SHORTFALLS
A. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
The purpose of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is to
ensure “[a]ccuracy and fairness of credit reporting” and require CRAs
to “adopt reasonable procedures” to protect the “confidentiality,
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization” of sensitive consumer
information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the
consumer.”61 The FCRA protects consumer privacy by limiting how
consumer credit information can be communicated or used, and it
gives consumers ways to access the data underlying their credit
scores, along with an understanding of how third parties use
consumer data in relation to credit, employment, and insurance
decisions.62
The FCRA primarily regulates CRAs, though it also places
obligations on third-party users of consumer reports and third-party
furnishers of data who provide CRAs with consumer information.63
The statute defines a CRA as “any person which . . . regularly engages
in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information . . . for the purpose
of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.”64 The last qualifier
in this definition—the requirement that consumer credit information
is furnished by CRAs to third parties—can help firms employing
alternative credit data avoid governance by the FCRA.65 Firms that
do not resell the data to third parties but still use the data for
credit-scoring purposes are not currently within the scope of the
FCRA because of the limitation in the statutory definition of CRA.66
While the FCRA does not promulgate definitions for users and
furnishers of consumer information, it does outline duties for entities
who use and provide consumer reports.67 Users of consumer reports
can only obtain the report if they have a statutorily permissible
purpose, such as credit transactions pertaining to a consumer seeking
credit, employment, or insurance underwriting.68 Furnishers of credit
61.
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 602, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x (2018)).
62.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 184.
63.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e, 1681m, 1681s-2.
64.
Id. § 1681a(f).
65.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 187.
66.
See id.
67.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, 1681m, 1681s-2.
68.
Id. § 1681b(a)(3)(A)–(C).
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reports have statutorily defined duties including providing accurate
information to CRAs, and in cases where information is inaccurate,
taking timely steps to provide notice to the CRA that the information
is inaccurate or may be in dispute.69
Users of consumer reports must also notify a consumer when
they use a CRA-provided report as the basis for an adverse action
against a consumer. An adverse action includes the denial of credit,
insurance, or employment opportunities or an increase in rates
charged for credit or insurance.70 The user of the consumer report is
also required to provide the relevant numerical credit score used
in the determination, all of the key factors (or the top four) that
adversely affected the consumer’s credit score, the date the relevant
credit score was created, and the name of the entity that provided the
credit score.71
Notably, there is no statutory requirement for a detailed
explanation of factors that are included as part of adverse action
notice.72 For example, users (and CRAs, when a consumer requests
her credit score) do not have to explain how the factors are weighted
or what the factors even mean; vague “phrases like ‘type of bank
accounts’ and ‘type of credit references’” are acceptable, even though
they do not help a consumer reliably understand how her individual
actions impact her credit score.73 This type of phrasing will be even
less useful for consumers when firms employ extremely complex
alternative scoring methodologies to provide adverse action notices.
Whether firms using alternative data generate reports that
fall into the statutory definition of consumer reports indicates how
these firms will be regulated.74 The definition of a consumer report is
broad and includes any information from a CRA that influences the
creditworthiness or reputation of a consumer.75 However, the
definition is limited by the requirement that information must relate
to “an identifiable person,” and not a subset of individuals in the
aggregate, such as a household or all of the individuals who live in
the same neighborhood.76 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
adopted the view that even if information is not linked to an
69.
Id. § 1681s-2.
70.
Id. § 1681a(k).
71.
Id. §§ 1681m(a)(2), 1681g(f)(1)(B)–(E).
72.
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014).
73.
Id.
74.
Hearing, supra note 3, at 10–11.
75.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 185.
76.
Id.
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identifiable person (e.g., by name), it qualifies as a consumer report
“if it could be reasonably linked [back] to the consumer.”77 The FTC’s
view is important given the expansion in the types of alternative Big
Data that are used, some forms of which may be traceable back to
individual consumers.78
B. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) prohibits
discrimination by a creditor against an applicant on the basis of
certain protected characteristics during any aspect of a credit
transaction.79 The following characteristics are protected against
discrimination: race, color, religion, national origin, marital status,
sex, age, public assistance status, and exercise of rights under the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.80 While “credit transaction” is not
explicitly defined in the ECOA, its enacting regulations define the
term broadly and include all aspects of an applicant’s interaction with
a creditor related to an application for new or existing credit.81
Experts interpret the breadth of these definitions to mean that in
addition to CRAs, fintech firms who provide consumer credit scores
or credit assessment tools are within the scope of the ECOA, even if
they do not make the ultimate lending decisions.82
There are two ways for a plaintiff to allege discrimination
under the ECOA: she can allege disparate treatment, disparate
impact, or both.83 To allege disparate treatment, the plaintiff must
make a showing that the lender based its decision to extend credit
based on “a discriminatory intent or motive.”84 To allege disparate
impact, the plaintiff must show that the lender’s practice resulted
in a “disproportionately negative impact on a prohibited basis”
regardless of whether the lender lacked the intent to discriminate.85
Plaintiffs alleging disparate impact in the ECOA context may face
heightened causation requirements if firms argue that their

77.
Id. at 186.
78.
See id. at 185–86.
79.
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 701(a), 88 Stat. 1500, 1521 (1974)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–91f (2018)).
80.
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1)–(3).
81.
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m) (2020).
82.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 191.
83.
Id. at 192.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
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methodologies simply mirror “existing forms of systemic bias.”86 Even
if a plaintiff is able to establish causation, the defendant can establish
that the challenged practice or policy is in place for a valid business
purpose.87 The purpose need not be essential or completely necessary
to business objectives; it must simply be relevant to the entity’s
business objectives.88
If a defendant can justify a challenged policy or practice with
a legitimate business objective, the plaintiff must still provide an
alternative method that mitigates the disparate impact but is still
equally effective in fulfilling the defendant’s business objectives.89
Given that credit-scoring algorithms—regardless of whether they use
traditional or alternative data—are trade secrets, it is an enormous
challenge for a plaintiff to overcome information asymmetries and
gain an understanding of the tools used by these firms.90
C. Gaps in the Existing Regulatory Framework
The existing regulatory framework, comprised primarily of the
FCRA and ECOA, is inadequate to address the challenges posed by
the use of alternative Big Data and complex proprietary algorithms
in credit scoring. Hurley, Adebayo, and Lee’s proposed model
legislation, the Model Fairness and Transparency in Credit Scoring
Act (FaTCSA) is designed to address the four major challenges the
authors identified in the use of alternative credit-scoring tools and
the insufficient regulatory framework surrounding them.91 This
model legislation addresses transparency and accuracy issues arising
from the shift towards alternative Big Data, as well as the possibility
of discriminatory and biased scoring practices and the opportunities
for firms employing these scoring practices to identify and
exploit consumers from disadvantaged backgrounds.92 The following
Subsections discuss the gaps in the regulatory framework
and present potential enhancements to the recommendations
incorporated in FaTCSA.

86.
Id. at 194.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 194.
89.
Id. at 194–95.
90.
Id. at 195.
91.
Id. (defining the four challenges as “1) insufficient transparency, 2) input data that
are potentially inaccurate, 3) the potential for biased and discriminatory scoring, and 4) the risk
that these tools will be used to target vulnerable consumers.”).
92.
Id. at 197–99.
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1. Transparency and Accuracy Issues
The purpose of transparency in credit scoring is to ensure that
scoring entities are held to standards reflecting their importance to
society, as well as to ensure that consumers who are unable to access
credit are able to understand the steps they must take to do so.93 It is
unlikely that consumers will be able to take steps to improve their
behaviors or identify mistakes in their credit reports if they are
unaware of the factors that impact their credit scores, especially given
the use of nontraditional data derived from Big Data that may not
have been adequately tested for accuracy.94
The biggest transparency-related issue with firms using
alternative credit scoring methodologies is the secrecy of the
methodologies used for developing the credit scores.95 Because the
methodologies are protected trade secrets, it is difficult to know
whether they conform to industry best practices or have been
evaluated and developed through consultation with experts.96 The
disclosure requirements in FaTCSA require firms to share their
methodologies with a state attorney general or a body acting under
the supervision of the state attorney general, but only upon request.97
Given how important these scoring methodologies are to
disadvantaged populations, the existing regulatory scheme can be
enhanced by making periodic alternative data-related methodology
disclosures mandatory, at least to federal regulators. Some experts
argue that to adequately test scoring systems, regulators would
require the input data used by scoring algorithms, along with source
code programmer notes, and other correlations integrated into
these algorithms.98 Additionally, commercial credit-rating agencies,
such as Moody’s, publish detailed summaries of their assessment
methodologies.99 Notably, commercial credit-rating agencies use data

93.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 72, at 11, 18; Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at
196–98 (noting that transparency issues in Big Data-driven alternative scoring systems stem from
the complexity of the algorithms used, the volume, breadth, and quality of data employed, and the
lack of insight into scoring methodologies developed and used by firms in the consumer credit
scoring industry).
94.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 72, at 11; see also Yu et al., supra note 48, at
14–16.
95.
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 72, at 33.
96.
See id. at 5, 25.
97.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 207.
98.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 72, at 25.
99.
See, e.g., Rating Methodology: Banking, MOODY’S INVS. SERV. (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=pbc_186998
[https://perma.cc/BYH4-WQKD].
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that has been audited, and therefore regulated, for accuracy.100 While
there may be more competition in the consumer credit-scoring market
due to the proliferation of fintech firms that employ consumer-scoring
methodologies, it does not make sense for firms to equate sharing
information with regulators with disclosing trade secrets to potential
competitors.
The FCRA does not adequately address the transparency
issues arising from the use of alternative data in consumer credit
scoring because it does not place any limitations on the types or
categories of data that can be used to evaluate consumer credit.
Additionally, it is not feasible for consumers to assume that every
data point collected about them may in some way impact their credit
scores.101 For example, the FCRA does not distinguish between the
inclusion of positive consumer data on timely payments or negative
consumer data reflecting late payments.102
While it is true that the inclusion of both positive and negative
data may increase the overall accuracy of credit scoring, the collection
of alternative data related to utility payments can further
disadvantage financially vulnerable consumers, especially those who
live in locations with harsher weather.103 For example, an individual
may need to choose between making or deferring a utility payment
for heat so that she can obtain help under federal assistance programs
that require her to defer payments before she becomes eligible for the
program benefits. In such scenarios, consumers may be forced to
choose between obtaining needed assistance for nondiscretionary
products or damaging their credit scores.104
Even if Congress had passed the Credit Access and Inclusion
Act of 2019, which would have amended the existing FCRA to permit
the reporting of positive data on lease agreements, as well as utility
and telecommunications services, there would still be gaps stemming
from negative data that could harm the credit scores of financially
disadvantaged consumers.105 The amendment would have prohibited
the reporting of negative data when the consumer has commenced
a payment plan to remedy late payments but does not outline
requirements for the timing of the reporting.106 It also fails to place
100.
See Credit Rating, C ORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/
knowledge/finance/credit-rating/ [https://perma.cc/78C2-U2QQ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021).
101.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 189.
102.
See id.; Carroll & Rehmani, supra note 21, at 12.
103.
See Carroll & Rehmani, supra note 21, at 12; Yu et al., supra note 48, at 13–14.
104.
See Yu et al., supra note 48, at 13–14.
105.
See Credit Access and Inclusion Act of 2019, S. 1828, 116th Cong. (2019).
106.
See id. § 2(a).
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an obligation on the firms to discuss or offer payment plans prior to
reporting negative data to CRAs.107 Data can be reported and
transferred much faster than payment plans can be established, and
if the data reporting precedes the consumer’s opportunity to protect
her credit score, the limitations on negative data in the statute are
not very effective.
2. Discrimination, Biased Scoring Practices, and Potential
Exploitation Issues
The existing ECOA does not adequately protect consumers,
especially those from disadvantaged groups, against accidental biases
built into alternative Big Data credit-scoring systems.108 Additionally,
it does not prevent firms from using this biased data to target
specific consumer groups with financial products with exceptionally
unfavorable terms that they would not offer other consumers.109 Many
ECOA-related issues stem from algorithms using nontraditional
data that may evaluate consumers based on societal associations or
protected characteristics rather than individual creditworthiness.110
The use of data highly correlated with a prohibited
characteristic can introduce similar biases into alternative consumer
credit-scoring methodologies that the ECOA was designed to
prevent.111 Because of the enormous volume of Big Data analyzed
by consumer credit-scoring algorithms, they may “indirectly
consider sensitive characteristics, such as race, even when those
characteristics are not directly designated as input values.”112 These
algorithms are designed to identify patterns and correlations between
hundreds of variables. It is easy to imagine that these algorithms
identify correlations between different behavioral traits that vary by
culture, social status, and characteristics that are protected under the
ECOA.113 Given that these systems are so complex and analyze such
a high volume of data that they are able to find relationships between
unrelated and random variables, it is even more apparent certain
variables, especially nontraditional behavioral variables that appear

107.
108.
109.
110.
27–28.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 197, 199.
See id. at 199.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 72, at 14; see also Yu et al., supra note 48, at
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1)–(3) (2018); Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 196.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 182.
See Yu et al., supra note 48, at 14.
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nondiscriminatory and neutral, are highly correlated with protected
characteristics.114
In addition to indirectly using prohibited characteristics in
assessing consumer credit risk, these algorithms may also be
developed and trained using data that does not have adequate
coverage across all groups of people, one of the most important
characteristics of a good data source.115 Consumers from different
racial and cultural backgrounds may access the internet in ways that
leave different types of digital footprints (e.g., using a mobile phone
versus a computer), and people from some cultures are more likely to
visit certain social media platforms than others.116 For these reasons,
using nontraditional behavioral data that is highly correlated with
certain protected characteristics in a consumer credit-scoring
algorithm can introduce bias against a protected group.117 The
implication of introducing this type of bias is that a consumer who
has a certain unchangeable characteristic (e.g., race or national
origin) may receive a rejection or less favorable lending terms than
she would have gotten had she not had those characteristics.118 In
other words, while alternative data can be very beneficial for the
expansion of credit, other forms of alternative data may introduce
prohibited biases into consumer credit scores.119
Additionally, the ECOA does not expressly protect consumers
from discrimination based on sexual orientation.120 The model
FaTCSA includes sexual orientation as one of its protected
characteristics.121 It is probably fairer to consumers from all sexual
orientations, especially those that are considered “nontraditional,” to
clearly prohibit discrimination on this basis rather than infer
protections from a different characteristic, such as sex.122
III. CLOSING THE GAPS IN THE EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A disclosure regime such as the one outlined in FaTCSA that
requires routine disclosures and attestation that the methodologies
used are not discriminatory is a good first step in reducing the risk of
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 199; Carroll & Rehmani, supra note 21, at 9.
Yu et al., supra note 48, at 27.
See id. at 27–28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 192.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 192.
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ECOA violations.123 However, additional steps can be taken to better
ensure that credit scorers using alternative scoring systems are doing
so in a nondiscriminatory way.
Mandating disclosures from firms involved in consumer credit
scoring is a potentially effective way to increase transparency.124
While the model FaTCSA’s disclosure requirements are robust and
shift the onus of verifying accuracy from the consumer to the
credit-scoring firms, they should more stringently trace how input
data is transformed into data consumed by scoring algorithms, also
known as “data lineage.”125 The model FaTCSA requires routine and
public disclosures regarding the types and classifications of data, the
sources and transformations of this data, the methods used to collect
it, and the particular data points or set of data points that the scoring
models treat as significant. It also outlines credit-scoring standards,
including requirements that “data must be regularly tested for
accuracy, verifiability, and traceability.”126 However, the model
FaTCSA does not have explicit disclosure requirements related to
the traceability of the data.127 Consumers may find it difficult to
understand where a listed data category or source was truly derived
from because many types of alternative data are transformed several
times before they are ultimately used by algorithms.128
The FCRA or supplemental legislation should also include
enhanced standards for adverse action notices for all CRAs and firms
that use alternative credit-scoring systems. Because it is permissible
for credit scorers to provide vague explanations in adverse action
notices, consumers have very limited insight into why an adverse
decision was made.129 A potential enhanced reporting notice should
not only include granular data points denoting specific types of
accounts and behaviors that influenced the decision to deny credit or
a favorable rate to a consumer, but it should also provide the
consumer with steps she can take to improve her score, as these may
not be immediately clear given the breadth of alternative data and
techniques used to collect it. Most importantly, an enhanced reporting
notice should inform consumers how the factors were weighed
relative to one another so the consumer is aware of which steps to
prioritize.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 206.
See id. at 204.
Id. at 175–76.
Citron & Pasquale, supra note 72, at 17.
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Additionally, lenders using alternative data-scoring systems
should disclose how they define “creditworthiness” so that consumers
can gain a better understanding of the standards they are being held
to. These disclosures will also hold lenders to an appropriate standard
for credit scoring.130 The model FaTCSA, like the regulations
promulgated to enforce the ECOA, requires that credit-scoring
systems are in place with the purpose of predicting a consumer’s
creditworthiness.131 However, neither the FCRA nor the ECOA
explicitly requires that consumer credit scorers disclose what
their definitions are.132 The lack of such a requirement is significant
because “a poorly-crafted definition could also lead to inadvertent
discrimination” if the definition is not tailored in a way that
prevents bias against protected characteristics.133 Implementing a
regulatory requirement that consumer credit scorers must define
creditworthiness could also be a good starting point to develop or
enhance model risk-management practices for consumer credit-risk
methodologies.
The use of a consumer’s internet-browsing data, including data
based on her social media network, should either be curtailed or
prohibited in consumer credit scoring because it introduces the risk
that a consumer will be evaluated based on negative attributes that
she, specifically, does not possess.134 In November 2019, the state of
New York adopted Assembly Bill A5294, which prohibits a CRA or
lender from using data derived from an individual consumer’s social
media network in its credit-scoring methodology.135 The amendment
was proposed to target a potential move toward integrating
130.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 173.
131.
Id. at 199–200.
132.
See Yu et al., supra note 48, at 20.
133.
Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 173.
134.
See id. at 174–75. But see Arnoud Boot, Peter Hoffmann, Luc Laeven & Lev Ratnovski,
Financial Intermediation and Technology: What’s Old, What’s New? 11–12 (Eur. Cent.
Bank, Working Paper No. 2438, 2020), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2438
~d0d447b9b6.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/A82D-LMTX] (suggesting that “Bigtech finance is most
effective when traditional financial intermediation is undersupplied” and noting that Alibaba’s
affiliate company Ant Financial “extends more credit lines in rural areas of China with a limited
presence of banks”).
135.
See, e.g., Act of Nov. 25, 2019, ch. 540, § 2, 2019 N.Y. Laws 540 (codified as amended
at N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-j(h) (McKinney 2021)). Prior to forwarding the legislation to Governor
Cuomo for his signature, the New York legislature substituted Assembly Bill A5294 for Senate
Bill S2302. See Senate Bill S2302, THE N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s2302 [https://perma.cc/JH73-75WJ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2021). The text of
A5294 is identical to S2302. See id.; Assembly Bill A5294, THE N.Y. ST. SENATE,
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/A5294 [https://perma.cc/CR89-WB8X] (last visited
Jan. 31, 2021).
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nontraditional data in FICO scores and to protect individuals from
bias based indirectly on geography, as many people develop social
networks based on their geographic regions.136 The amendment to
New York’s general business and banking laws defines “members of
a consumer’s social network” as “a group of individuals authorized by
a consumer to be part of his or her social media communications and
network.”137 The amendment specifically states: “No consumer
reporting agency shall . . . evaluate . . . the credit worthiness . . . of
members of the consumer’s social network for purposes of
determining the credit worthiness of the consumer.”138
Similar legislation should be enacted at the federal level
rather than leaving it up to individual states to decide whether
they want to protect more vulnerable consumers. From the
perspective of distributive justice, it is unfair for vulnerable
consumers in some states to receive better protections against
discrimination in credit scoring while consumers in other states do
not. Consumers from financially disadvantaged backgrounds may not
have the resources to move from a state with poor consumer
protection laws to consumer-friendly states, such as California or
New York. Further, many historically underprivileged communities
experience regionalized inequality.139 These communities may live in
areas where many policies are unfavorable to them (e.g., social
services, criminal justice, and education), not just consumer
protection laws.140 Legislation that enables all consumers in these
communities to access credit as a vehicle to increase their financial
wealth may be helpful in alleviating these regional inequalities as
well.141
If passing legislation limiting the use of nontraditional,
social media-derived data is not feasible at a federal level, then
the agencies regulating firms using alternative credit-scoring
systems should operate under the presumption that alternative data
is discriminatory. The US Department of Financial Services
recommends that insurers located in New York conduct their due
diligence and ensure that alternative data does not introduce bias
136.
See Senate Bill S2302, supra note 135.
137.
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-a(u).
138.
Id. § 380-j(h).
139.
Jay Shambaugh, Ryan Nunn & Stacy A. Anderson, How Racial and Regional
Inequality Affect Economic Opportunity, BROOKINGS (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
blog/up-front/2019/02/15/how-racial-and-regional-inequality-affect-economic-opportunity/
[https://perma.cc/B8C6-GFLH].
140.
Id.
141.
See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 72, at 11, 18.

646

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:3:625

based on any protected characteristics, even if the data is purchased
from a third party.142 Most importantly, the guidance indicates that
insurers should be extremely cautious in employing alternative data
and states that alternative data should not be used in an “algorithm
or predictive model in underwriting or rating unless the insurer can
establish that the underwriting or rating guidelines are not
unfairly discriminatory.”143 Therefore, this guidance may encourage
lenders to employ more rigorous practices in selecting the data used
for consumer credit scoring, as well as ensure that the data does
not introduce biased correlations into the scoring system. If
regulators conduct audits under the rebuttable presumption that
alternative data is discriminatory, the burden of proving fairness
would shift to the lenders, an idea similar to the FaTCSA model
legislation.144
If legislative and regulatory changes are slow, then regulatory
agencies should encourage firms to seek no-action letters with terms
that benefit both the lender and the regulatory agencies such that
the regulatory agency can gain insight into the methodologies and
credit-risk management practices of the lenders.145 In 2017, the
CFPB issued a no-action letter to Upstart Network, a firm that
uses alternative data in addition to traditional data for the purposes
of consumer credit underwriting and pricing.146 The CFPB’s issuance
of the no-action letter was conditioned on Upstart Network
maintaining “a model risk management and compliance plan that
requires it to analyze and appropriately address risks to consumers,
as well as assess the real-world impact of alternative data and
machine learning.”147 These impacts are shared with the CFPB,
along with data comparing outputs of alternative and traditional
models, information that could be very valuable to the CFPB’s
efforts to appropriately regulate CSAs and users of consumer
reports.148

142.
Insurance Circular Letter No. 1, N.Y. ST . DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS. (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/circular_letters/cl2019_01 [https://perma.cc/RB4T-EHY4].
143.
See id.
144.
See Hurley & Adebayo, supra note 1, at 198–99 (explaining how the Model FaTCSA
shifts the burden of ensuring accuracy from consumers to credit scorers).
145.
See Patrice Alexander Ficklin & Paul Watkins, An Update on Credit Access and
the Bureau’s First No-Action Letter, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/update-credit-access-and-no-action-letter/
[https://perma.cc/Z5UR-7VPJ].
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See id.
147.
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The results provided as part of the no-action letter plan were
promising for both consumers and lenders.149 They indicate that
improving transparency, by requiring disclosures and employing
adequate risk-management practices, to prevent discriminatory
lending practices can improve financial inclusion in consumer credit
scoring using alternative data.150 The Upstart data was promising,
with extension of credit increasing by upwards of 20 percent and
average APRs decreasing by 15–17 percent across all “tested race,
ethnicity, and sex segments.”151 It is notable that the use of
alternative data did not completely supplant traditional data in the
consumer credit-scoring methodology, and the primary forms of
alternative data used were educational attainment or employment
history.152 There was no use of behavioral data from consumer
browsing history or social media networks incorporated into these
models, as well as no utilities-related data.153
IV. FUTURE OUTLOOK
As the use of alternative data continues to gain momentum
across various parts of the financial sector, regulatory bodies will
need to define the roles they will play. Because regulatory agencies
are still seeking to understand the impacts and methodologies
surrounding alternative credit systems, fintech firms and their
product offerings may be regulated on either a consolidated or
fragmented basis.154 These regulatory decisions will have enormous
implications not just for financial inclusion on the consumer side but
also for profitability and risk management of lenders who seek to
extend consumer credit.
To ensure consumer credit is more accessible, regulators
should adopt a disclosure regime and consumer-friendly regulatory
framework that provide consumers with a more financially inclusive

149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Upstart Request for No-Action Letter, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 4 (2017),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter-request.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DX9A-2664].
153.
See id. at 5.
154.
Luz Maria Salamina, Pratibha Chhabra, Shalini Sankaranarayan & Collen Masunda,
Disruptive Technologies in the Credit Information Sharing Industry: Developments and
Implications, WORLD BANK GRP. 29–31 (2019), http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/
en/587611557814694439/pdf/Disruptive-Technologies-in-the-Credit-Information-Sharing-Industry-Developments-and-Implications.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHJ5-PSG9].
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credit system.155 Such a system would not only ensure more
access to consumers in the United States but also to those in
developing countries, where there are even larger information
asymmetries.156
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